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Lessons for Policymakers and 
Regulators on the (Predictable) 
Future of the Digital Economy
Kevin Werbach, JD
Decades into the internet revolution, new business functions are still making 
their way online.
The next stage of the digital ecosystem will involve 
trillions of networked devices, across every industry 
and sphere of human activity. This phenomenon can 
be thought of as the “Internet of the World.” It can be 
seen in the intersection of three highly visible trends: 
The On-Demand Economy, the Internet of Things, 
and Big Data. Together they mark a global sea-change 
that will penetrate every sector of the economy (see 
Exhibit 1). 
Companies taking advantage of these three 
interconnected trends are experiencing tremendous 
growth.1 Roughly six years after it launched, Uber is 
the world’s most valuable private company, raising its 
latest funding round at a valuation of $62.5 billion.2 
It now operates in over 300 cities worldwide and has 
over one million drivers in its network.3 Airbnb is not 
far behind. Its valuation in its latest funding round 
is $30 billion,4 and it has grown to over one million 
rooms worldwide, more than traditional hotel chains 
such as Marriott and Hilton.5 The potential scale of 
on-demand services is also much greater than the 
legacy industries they challenge. By changing the 
nature of the marketplace, on-demand services actually 
create new demand. And the impacts are not limited 
to the customer side. Millions of people around the 
SUMMARY
• The next stage in the evolution of the digital economy involves the 
creation of what can be called the “Internet of the World”—an 
expanding web of transactions, anticipated today by on-demand 
platforms such as Uber and Airbnb, that eventually will occur 
across trillions of networked devices and penetrate every sphere 
of human activity.
• These novel on-demand services are raising many thorny legal 
questions. This brief looks in particular at the regulatory clas-
sification of on-demand services, as well as the application of 
antitrust provisions, the imposition of taxes and fees, and the 
assignment of liability to these new platforms.
• These legal issues, however, are not novel. History suggests 
that regulators and business innovators will work together to 
address them as the Internet of the World continues to evolve. 
As observed in the early days of the commercial internet, leaders 
in the emerging digital economy will welcome further govern-
ment engagement, which can serve business interests in many 
ways. And policymakers will embrace creative solutions that 
meet regulatory goals without imposing standards created for 
legacy industries that are ill-suited to new platforms.
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world are becoming providers through 
these platforms, experiencing a new 
form of on-demand work. 
Just as electronic commerce, online 
communications, and digital content 
distribution transformed markets 
beginning in the late 1990s, broad-
band and social networks in the early 
2000s, and mobile services in the late 
2000s, the Internet of the World will 
disrupt existing industries and create 
new ones, and in the process, will pose 
dramatic challenges for businesses, 
regulators, and policymakers. Early 
manifestations of this evolution are 
raising serious legal questions, involv-
ing regulatory classification, competi-
tion, taxation, consumer protection, 
and other controversies. Debates are 
raging over whether novel services 
such as Uber and Airbnb should be 
subject to rules designed for legacy 
industries. The stage seems set for a 
decisive battle between regulation 
and innovation. Yet this perspective 
is mistaken. It is rooted in a perva-
sive and persistent misunderstanding 
about a “digital dichotomy,” which 
views online transactions and connec-
tions as being fundamentally different 
from interactions in the “real world.” 
Consequently, the great innovative 
business success stories of the last two 
decades have involved waves of hype 
about unstoppable disruption alter-
nating with periods of backlash over 
threats to long-established industries 
and well-functioning markets.
Ultimately, though, emerging 
businesses will welcome govern-
ment engagement, and regulatory 
actors will accept creative solutions 
to achieve their policy goals. We can 
expect such a resolution because the 
 1  PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Sharing Economy: How Will 
it Disrupt Your Business? (August 2014), http://pwc.blogs.
com/files/sharing-economy-final_0814.pptx. 
 2  Alex Konrad, “Uber Raises $3.5 Billion From Saudi Sover-
eign Wealth Fund, Keeps $62.5 Billion Valuation,” Forbes, 
June 1, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkon-
rad/2016/06/01/uber-raises-3-5-billion-from-saudi-sov-
ereign-fund-at-62-5-billion-valuation/#2b3dc26c41d4. 
 3  Luz Lazo, “Uber Turns 5, Reaches 1 Million Drivers and 
300 Cities Worldwide. Now What?” Washington Post, 
June 4, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
dr-gridlock/wp/2015/06/04/uber-turns-5-reaches-1-mil-
lion-drivers-and-300-cities-worldwide-now-what/.  
 4  “Airbnb’s Funding Round Led by Google Capital,” Wall 
Street Journal, September 22, 2016, http://www.wsj.
com/articles/airbnb-raises-850-million-at-30-billion-
valuation-1474569670. 
 5  Julie Weed, “Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel 
Rivals Are Quiet, for Now,” New York Times, May 11, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/airbnb-
grows-to-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for-
now.html.  
 6  In the case of Uber and Airbnb, the “things” are not direct-
ly connected as with networked sensors; a smartphone or 
tablet serves as the interface that links the physical asset 
into the network, with a human in between. From the 
user’s standpoint, however, this distinction is immaterial. 
 7  Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolu-
tion of the Internet Is Changing Everything, Cisco White 
Paper (April 2011), http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/
about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf. 
 8  Brett M. Frischmann and Barbara van Schewick, “Network 
Neutrality and the Economics of an Information Super-
NOTES
EXHIBIT 1: DEFINING FEATURES OF THE INTERNET OF THE WORLD 
 
On-Demand Economy Platforms  
•  Use software and networks to liberate and aggregate otherwise-independent spare labor or asset 
capacity 
•  Respond to consumer demand in real time, replicating the immediacy and rapid scalability of e-
commerce services such as Netflix or iTunes
•  Do not own the assets to which they offer access, but create virtual marketplaces using the internet 
and mobile devices (i.e., the software representation of the asset effectively becomes the asset)
•  Dedicated to maximizing revenues and profits, despite sometimes being described as the Sharing 
Economy
The Internet of Things (IoT)  
•  Involves network connectivity for devices other than personal computers, phones, and tablets 
•  Turns anything not traditionally a computing device into a network-aware source of data collection or 
manipulation6
•  Aggregates individual devices into networked systems, which in turn can shape their actions 
•  Cisco predicts that by 2020, there will be 50 billion non-computing devices connected to the inter-
net, many times the number of PCs and smartphones7 
Big Data Capabilities 
•  The assembly of massive data sets of information about people and the world, enabled by the emer-
gence of cloud computing and networked data centers that can process vast amounts of data within 
the network 
•  The distillation and analysis of those data sets as a whole (i.e., instead of through the statistical 
method of sampling), thus allowing entire data sets to be run through computer-driven algorithms 
and generating predictive models that find patterns in networks of correlations 
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exact same story played out twenty 
years ago, in the early days of the 
commercial internet. 
CYBER HISTORY AS A GUIDE
Twenty years ago, a wave of start-
ups such as Netscape, eBay, Yahoo!, 
Amazon burst on the scene with 
hyperbolic growth rates, generat-
ing dramatic impacts on established 
industries. Legal and regulatory 
controversies ensued. The debates 
followed a common pattern: oscilla-
tion between calls for self-regulation 
or unregulation, on the one hand, and 
clumsy efforts to impose excessive 
regulation, on the other, eventually 
giving way to accommodations in 
which government played more of a 
convening, legitimizing, and enforce-
ment role than a rule-setter. Historical 
examples of internet businesses and 
policymakers recognizing govern-
ment’s potentially constructive role 
in the digital economy include the 
Microsoft antitrust case, the Inter-
net Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), and 
the push for network neutrality rules 
against discrimination by broadband 
access providers.8 
Policymakers and regulators would 
do well to remember that government 
engagement with innovative markets 
and industries can serve a number of 
positive goals. These include: 
•  Legitimizing new business models
•  Facilitating competition in cases of 
market failure
•  Increasing trust in new services by 
setting baselines and remedies
•  Restraining other government actors 
from harmful decisions
•  Eliminating situations in which 
vague or overlapping obligations 
create difficulties for new entrants. 
Government can also take an 
affirmative stand in favor of inno-
vation or new entrants, such as by 
delaying the imposition of particular 
industry requirements or impos-
ing limitations on established firms 
that might crush newcomers. In the 
last few years, as the On-Demand 
Economy has evolved, controver-
sies have arisen about the legality of 
on-demand services under local and 
state laws; responsibility for taxes and 
fees; data privacy; consumer protec-
tion requirements; compliance with 
the Americans with Disabilities Act; 
anti-competitive practices; discrimina-
tion; and the legal status of workers. 
The next section of this brief will take 
a closer look at these different contro-
versies, and place them into context 
with similar debates that erupted 
earlier in the dotcom era.
NEW ENTERPRISES, OLD 
PROBLEMS, AND CREATIVE 
COMPROMISES
Predictably, the initial position of 
on-demand and other startups is that 
they cannot and should not be subject 
to legacy regulations, and therefore 
should be left to regulate themselves. 
Equally unsurprising is the contrary 
movement urging that the on-demand 
providers be barred from operating 
unless they meet the requirements of 
existing regulations. Neither option 
is tenable. Fortunately, the dotcom 
era startups of the 1990s and those 
of today’s Internet of the World face 
similar policy challenges, which are 
playing out in a familiar pattern. 
REGULATORY CLASSIFICATION
The first and most prominent issue 
concerns how to classify new ser-
vices that do not easily fit into avail-
able legal categories. Today, Uber’s 
business model of entering markets 
without legal authorization is most 
directly analogous to peer-to-peer 
startups like Skype. Of the 276 cities 
in which Uber operated at the end of 
2014, only 17 had passed ordinances 
expressly authorizing its business.9 In 
most major cities around the world, 
for-hire transportation service can 
highway: A Reply to Professor Yoo,” Jurimetrics Journal 
47 (2007), 383, 384–89.
 9  Eva Grantsimran Khosla, “Here’s Everywhere Uber is 
Banned Around the World,” Business Insider, April 8, 
2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-every-
where-uber-is-banned-around-the-world-2015-4.  
 10  There appears to be a contrast to the parallel dotcom era 
startups, namely that many of the rules governing on-
demand service providers are local instead of national or 
global, but the basic controversies cover similar ground. 
The ultimate equilibrium for services such as Uber is likely 
to involve similar treatment in all major cities.
 11  Mike Isaac, “Airbnb Pledges to Work With Cities and Pay 
‘Fair Share’ of Taxes,” New York Times, November 11, 
2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/
airbnb-pledges-to-work-with-cities-and-pay-fair-share-
of-taxes.html. 
 12  Felix Barber, “How Do We Fight 21st Century Monopo-
lies like Amazon, Google and Uber?” Upstart Business 
Journal, December 11, 2014, http://upstart.bizjournals.
com/resources/author/2014/12/11/fight-21st-century-
monopolies-like-amazon-uber.html?page=all.  
 13  Matthew Stoller, “Uber’s Algorithmic Monopoly, Observa-
tions on Credit and Surveillance,” April 9, 2014, http://
mattstoller.tumblr.com/post/82233202309/ubers-algo-
rithmic-monopoly-we-are-not-setting. 
 14  llen P. Grunes and Maurice E. Stucke, “No Mistake About 
It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data,” 
The Antitrust Source (April 2015), http://www.american-
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/
apr15_grunes_4_22f.authcheckdam.pdf. See also Anja 
Lambrecht and Catherine E. Tucker, Can Big Data Protect 
a Firm from Competition? (Working Paper, December 18, 
NOTES 
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only be provided by licensed taxis or 
licensed livery services. Uber, which 
views itself as a software application 
that matches independent driv-
ers and riders, fits neither category 
well. Accordingly, the company has 
waged an aggressive campaign against 
localities refusing to authorize its 
business.10
The key for Skype was that 
regulators were convinced the com-
pany actually promoted public policy 
goals and that necessary obligations 
could be enforced without forcing 
the company into legacy regulatory 
classifications. Major on-demand 
platforms have begun to advocate for 
a similar approach, focusing on tar-
geted initiatives to address recognized 
problems. For example, Airbnb in 
November 2015 issued a “Community 
Compact” detailing affirmative steps it 
would take to work with regulators on 
acknowledged issues.11 
The process has gone farthest in 
the ride-hailing market. At least 29 
states have adopted laws defining and 
regulating “transportation network 
companies” (TNCs), with legislation 
under consideration in several others. 
These laws provide an opportunity to 
ensure that the public policy goals of 
traditional regulations are achieved, 
even when the business model 
changes. They recognize that a choice 
between ill-fitting legacy rules and no 
rules at all is not a good outcome. 
COMPETITION
Even the most mature on-demand 
markets are still young and fast-
changing, so antitrust authorities 
have been hesitant to intervene, but 
over time, concerns over competi-
tion may escalate. Uber, because of its 
hyperbolic growth and dominance in 
ride-hailing markets, has already been 
subject to attacks as a monopolist after 
just six years in business.12 A counter-
argument to accusations of monopo-
listic behavior is that on-demand 
markets have little in the way of entry 
barriers from a technical standpoint. 
As a result, there is reason to believe 
market discipline will self-correct 
for anti-competitive practices. This 
perspective, however, fails to take into 
account novel concerns that arise in 
an environment where physical assets 
and even people can be treated as 
information and manipulated through 
software driven by big data analytics. 
Today’s on-demand and IoT services 
are based on software algorithms 
driven by significant volumes of real-
time data. The data itself potentially 
becomes the foundation for what have 
been called “algorithmic monopo-
lies.”13 The more data a service has, 
the better the quality of its decisions. 
Just as the Microsoft antitrust case 
forced an examination of the growing 
importance of personal computer soft-
ware to existing and developing indus-
tries, on-demand services will bring 
algorithmic competition policy ques-
tions to the fore. Even when there are 
no entry barriers in the conventional 
sense, a dominant player with control 
over data may have an insurmountable 
edge over potential competitors.14 In 
the case of Uber, the market “is” what-
ever Uber’s algorithms say it is. The 
software controls not only the price, 
but the timing and boundaries of its 
so-called surge pricing, as well as what 
information is provided to drivers and 
when. It is impossible to know from 
mere observation whether algorithms 
are being used in anti-competitive or 
discriminatory ways.15 
Another concern involves the 
possibility that these decision-making 
algorithms can cooperate with one 
another to engage in price fix-
ing. Such “algorithmic cartels” may 
develop even without explicit instruc-
tions from the service providers, 
because they represent the efficient 
solution to maximize each firm’s prof-
its.16 In an on-demand world, more 
and more resources that were previ-
2015), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_soci-
ety/newsroom/image/document/2016-6/computer_and_
communications_industry_association_-_can_big_data_
protect_a_firm_from_competition_13846.pdf. 
 15  The Federal Trade Commission has formed a new Office 
of Technology Research and Investigation, which among 
other things has a mandate to examine algorithmic trans-
parency.
 16  Jill Priluck, “When Bots Collude,” New Yorker, April 25, 
2015, http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
when-bots-collude; Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, 
Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers In-
hibit Competition, (University of Tennessee Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 267), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2591874. 
 17  Kevin Werbach, “Is Uber a Common Carrier?” I/S: A 
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 12 
(2016). 
 18  Christina Le, “The Honeymoon’s Over: States Crack Down On 
the Virtual World’s Tax-Free Love Affair with E-Commerce,” 
Houston Business and Tax Law Journal 7 (2007), 395.
 19  Joyce E. Cutler, “Cities Grappling with Challenges of How 
to Tax, Regulate Short-Term Rentals,” Bloomberg BNA 
Daily Tax Report, October 21, 2014, http://www.bna.com/
cities-grappling-challenges-n17179897258/.  
 20  Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, “Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of 
‘Tens of Millions’ to S.F.,” SFGate, February 18, 2015, 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/M-R- 
Airbnb-pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-6087802.php. 
 21  Ibid.
 22  Now that the company is well established and dominant 
in its market, the displacement effects for both hosts and 
guests are likely to be limited. 
NOTES 
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ously subject to fixed prices or deliv-
ered by traditional service providers 
will be available through dynamically 
created algorithmic marketplaces. 
Finally, as the Internet of the 
World develops, on-demand services 
will become more foundational for 
commerce and communities. Certain 
competitive tactics that are otherwise 
legitimate may need to be curtailed 
for firms that enjoy the benefits of 
controlling essential services, in a 
manner akin to utility regulation.17 
TAXATION AND FEES
The growth of the On-Demand 
Economy raises two kinds of tax 
issues. The first involves collec-
tion of personal taxes from workers 
providing on-demand services, such 
as Uber drivers, but these tax issues 
generally can be resolved by reference 
to existing rules. In contrast, ques-
tions about the responsibility of the 
on-demand platforms themselves to 
remit taxes and fees leads to thornier 
issues, as such questions raise issues 
of equity with pre-existing providers, 
and, as with the sales taxation issues 
for e-commerce, drains funding from 
local and state governments. The 
debates over taxation and fees for on-
demand services began as classic con-
flicts between governments seeking to 
impose obligations and new compa-
nies, such as Amazon, seeking to avoid 
them. But as the history of sales taxes 
for e-commerce shows, complications 
can eventually be resolved in a man-
ner that does not overly disadvantage 
innovative new market entrants.18 
The On-Demand Economy 
company most directly confronting 
taxation is Airbnb. The company has 
tussled with cities over proper tax 
arrangements.19 Most major Ameri-
can cities impose a tax, in some cases a 
substantial one (14% in San Francisco, 
for example), on hotel rooms. Because 
Airbnb styles itself as a passive inter-
mediary, it originally declined to add 
these local taxes to the rates that its 
hosts charged to their guests. From 
cities’ viewpoint, however, this was a 
clear evasion of taxes by a direct com-
petitor to traditional hotels. Nation-
wide, Airbnb was estimated to owe as 
much as $200 million.20 
Fairly quickly, there has been a 
significant shift. In February 2015, 
Airbnb paid an estimated $25 million 
in back taxes to the city of San Fran-
cisco.21 It is negotiating with several 
cities about arrangements that would 
require it to collect hotel taxes from 
its hosts.22 It is important to empha-
size that the company wants these 
arrangements because they come with 
explicit authorization for Airbnb’s 
short-term rentals, which otherwise 
would violate current regulations in 
many jurisdictions. Through compro-
mise, both sides actually win.
PLATFORM RESPONSIBILITY
According to Uber, the company 
serves as a directory for matching 
drivers with riders. But the argu-
ment that it is essentially a souped-up 
phone book flies in the face of reality. 
The On-Demand Economy depends 
on trust, and consumers trust the 
platform, not the individual provid-
ers. There have been many ques-
tions about what is needed to ensure 
against harmful conduct by individu-
als on an on-demand platform. And 
as a practical matter, individual pro-
viders of on-demand services may not 
have the resources to fully compensate 
users for injuries. Therefore, neither 
regulators nor consumers have been 
satisfied that on-demand platforms 
can shift liability to providers in  
their networks. 
The Internet of the World dra-
matically alters the dimension that 
traditionally distinguishes employees 
from independent contractors (i.e., 
how on-demand providers are classi-
fied today): control. A new legal cat-
egory of employment with elements 
 23  Robert Sprague, “Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing 
Economy: Square Pegs Trying to Fit in Round Holes,” ABA 
Journal of Labor and Employment Law, forthcoming. 
 24  Airbnb has asserted that it falls within the Section 230 
safe harbor, although this claim has not been tested. 
 25  Molly Cohen and Arun Sundararajan, “Self- Regulation 
and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy,” Di-
alogue: The University of Chicago Law Review 82 (2015), 
116; see also Emily Badger, “What Happens When Uber 
and Airbnb Become their Own Regulators,” Washington 
Post WonkBlog, February 4, 2015, https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/04/what-happens-
when-uber-and-airbnb-become-their-own-regulators.  
 26  Lawrence Lessig, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach,” 113 Harvard Law Review 113 (1999), 501.
 27  Nick Grossman, “Regulation, the Internet Way: A Data-First 
Model for Establishing Trust, Safety, and Security,” Data-
Smart City Solutions, April 8, 2015, http://datasmart.ash.
harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-the-
internet-way-660. 
 28  Nick Grossman, “Here’s the Solution to the Uber and Airbnb 
Problems—and No One Will Like It,” The Slow Hunch, July 
23, 2015, http://www.nickgrossman.is/2015/07/23/heres-
the-solution-to-the-uber-and-airbnb-problems-and-no-one-
will-like-it/.
NOTES 
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of both employees and independent 
contractors may ultimately  
be needed.23 
Regardless of how the labor clas-
sification is resolved, the broader issue 
concerns the level of responsibility 
that should inure to these new kinds 
of platforms. When something goes 
wrong on an on-demand platform, 
it is no longer a question of design 
or manufacturing flaws in individual 
products. Software vendors such as 
Microsoft have successfully avoided 
liability for defects and security flaws, 
based on contractual disclaimers and 
limitations on liability, but the Inter-
net of the World potentially turns 
everything into a software system. 
Since 1996, the “safe harbor” 
regime of Section 230 of Title 47 of 
the U.S. Code (passed as part of the 
Communications Decency Act) has 
been a significant protector of online 
intermediaries against a host of legal 
claims based on the actions of their 
users. It protects internet service 
providers and all manner of online 
content and application services, but 
it does not cover services delivered in 
the physical world.24 A clear concern 
for policymakers, therefore, is how to 
construct a safe harbor regime for the 
new generation of platforms while still 
protecting consumers. On-demand 
companies may be the only entities 
capable of taking effective enforce-
ment actions against those who cause 
injuries, and they may be the only 
actors with sufficient resources to 
compensate the injured. However, 
excessive liability risk can prevent 
valuable services from being offered or 
it can create perverse incentives. Law 
exists, in the first place, to protect cer-
tain values, but it undoubtedly shapes 
business models as much as it allocates 
responsibilities for compensation. 
DIGITAL CODE AND DATA AS 
ALTERNATIVES TO DIRECT 
REGULATION
The imminent collapse of the digital 
dichotomy undermines the arguments 
for new institutions specially designed 
to encompass online activity. Both 
in the dotcom era and more recently, 
established governance and regulatory 
mechanisms have proven sufficiently 
adaptable to address new issues raised 
by innovative, fast-growing startups. 
The need for new flexibility and new 
regulation should not be equated with 
the inherent superiority of new legal 
institutions. Existing regulators, such 
as local taxi commissions, may be 
obstinate and captured by incumbents, 
but they are subject to procedural pro-
tections and political influences that 
may correct for such flaws. The way 
that Uber and Airbnb have gradually 
reached accommodations through 
local negotiations and state preemp-
tive legislation suggests these factors 
can be influential when the startups 
are willing to come to the table. 
An alternative approach to new 
direct regulation would be to enable 
private governance activity under 
the umbrella of public regulatory 
oversight. There are several variants 
of self-regulation, co-regulation, and 
delegated regulation that would free 
private actors from the inefficiencies 
of direct government mandates (e.g., 
restrictive licensing and verification 
procedures) while still ensuring that 
public interest obligations (e.g., rider 
or occupant safety and consumer 
protection) are met.25 In particular 
cases, software code might be more 
or less desirable than legal code in 
regulating behavior. Uber’s reputation 
rankings, for example, may produce 
better results at preventing invidious 
discrimination than established legal 
regimes do. With both digital code 
and the legal code at the disposal  
of policymakers, the question 
becomes: which mode of regulation  
is most transparent and least subject 
to overreach?26
One way to strike this balance 
may be a new regulatory paradigm 
that shifts from ex ante permission 
to ex post data-driven accountabil-
ity.27 On-demand companies could 
be exempted from certain regulations 
if they provide a real-time data feed 
and the opportunity for regulators to 
audit their behavior, demonstrating 
their compliance with public policy 
mandates.28 Uber and Airbnb initially 
resisted requests for granular data that 
could assist regulators. Yet they have 
begun to recognize that voluntary 
disclosure may be superior to (and 
potentially could head off ) direct 
regulation. Notably, data-sharing 
alone is not a complete solution to 
the range of legal issues the Internet 
of the World generates. Its effective-
ness should be judged in each context 
based on its ability to achieve well-
articulated public interest objectives. 
The general point is that there are 
more options than new companies 
simply ignoring regulation and regu-
lators blocking their operations. Both 
sides of that debate are under the illu-
sion of the digital dichotomy. 
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CONCLUSION
The emerging Internet of the World 
represents the final destruction of 
artificial divisions between real and 
virtual. Physical entities are becoming 
extensions or information feeds for 
digital processors. Many of the advan-
tages previously reserved for digital 
goods such as iTunes songs or Netflix 
movies are now available to physical 
goods and local services provided by 
humans. At some point, there is virtu-
ally no asset in a growing number of 
categories that cannot be delivered on 
demand through digital systems. 
Policymakers and regulators who 
think they can apply old rules to new 
platforms will encounter both legal 
and practical difficulties. Just as in 
the dotcom era, the policy debate 
has become a fight over whether new 
enterprises should be regulated under 
the old regime or left unregulated, 
despite the problems of such artifi-
cially sharp divisions. The oft-repeated 
mantra that law and regulation move 
more slowly than technology should 
not be the end of the discussion. The 
celebration of innovation also should 
not obscure that law exists to protect 
core societal values precisely because 
values generally do not change. 
Between ill-fitting legacy regulations 
and none at all, targeted compromise 
facilitated by the eager participation 
of a proactive government is the best 
strategy for navigating the controver-
sies produced by the Internet of the 
World. Indeed, recent history could 
not be clearer on this point.
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